Showing posts with label Ixtoc I. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ixtoc I. Show all posts

Saturday, June 12, 2010

BP - White House Attempt Cover-up Worst Oil Spill in Human History

Gulf Oil Spill Update 24May2010Image by DigitalGlobe-Imagery via Flickr

Tom Eley
The history of a cover-up
New evidence undermines latest BP-White House estimate of spill size

On Thursday, BP and Obama administration efforts to conceal the size of the Deepwater Horizon spill were delivered another blow when teams of scientists estimated that the rate of the oil spill as of early last week was between 30,000 and 50,000 barrels (1.2 million to 2.1 million gallons) per day, and possibly higher.

The figures are staggering. Fifty-three days after the explosion on the Deepwater Horizon that killed 11 workers, somewhere between 63 million and 107 million gallons of oil have spilled into the Gulf of Mexico, according to the latest estimates. Between every five and nine days the spill equals the Exxon Valdez, which dumped about 11 million gallons into Alaska’s Prince William Sound in 1989.

An Associated Press analysis notes that, even taking the low-end estimate, “if those 63 million gallons of oil were put in gallon milk jugs, they would line up side by side for nearly 5,500 miles.”

Some scientists, among them Ira Leifer of the government-sponsored Flow Rate Technical Group (FRTG), believe that BP’s decision to cut the riser pipe in order to siphon off a portion of the oil may have actually made the spill far worse. The well could feasibly release as many as 10 million gallons per day, according to a worst-case scenario revealed in paperwork BP submitted for each of its two relief wells.

It appears the spill will continue at least until mid-August—a minimum of 60 more days—and will perhaps drag on into September. This is when relief wells drilled diagonally to intercept with and plug the Deepwater Horizon’s may be completed—although there is no certainty that these can succeed. If it has not done so already, the BP spill by then will have easily eclipsed the worst oil spill on record, the 140 million gallons the Ixtoc I rig dumped off of Mexico’s Gulf coast in 1979 and 1980. According to marine biologists, the environmental and human impacts of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill are already far worse than the Ixtoc I, which was mitigated by its location and favorable currents.

The worst oil spill in human history has been, since its first days, the subject of a cover-up carried out by BP and the White House. The Obama administration and the oil giant have repeatedly been forced to increase their estimates in the face of scientific criticism, even as they collude to deny scientists and engineers access to the spill site. But each new official estimate, it has been revealed, was only the latest lie.

The effort to obscure the spill’s dimensions—based on profit calculations for BP and the Obama administration’s desire to promote deep-sea oil drilling—has, from the beginning, made it impossible to determine the best way to respond to the spill. The distance the spill can travel—and the level of the toxicity it can maintain—are based largely on its volume.

When the explosion took place on the Deepwater Horizon on April 20, there was a very high likelihood that the rig would collapse, in which case the riser connecting it to the ocean floor one mile below would crumple and burst. This is in fact what happened. But neither BP nor the Obama administration took practical steps to prepare for that eventuality.

On April 23, even after the rig collapsed, BP insisted there was no spill. This was seconded by Coast Guard officer Mary Landry, who for weeks functioned as spokesman for BP. Oil visible on the surface, BP and the Coast Guard claimed, was fuel from the collapsed rig.

At the time, BP hoped that the failed blowout preventer could be activated by robots to cut off the flow. This proved impossible.In these first four days after the explosion, the attempts of BP and the Obama administration to dismiss the possibility of a spill cost the Gulf Coast dearly. Some experts say that if booms could have been used to encircle what was then a very small spill area, a much larger disaster could have been averted. No such steps were taken.

It was not until a large spill, many miles in diameter, became visible on the ocean’s surface on April 24 that BP admitted there was a spill beyond the fuel that had been aboard the rig. By then the spill was so large booms could not be used to contain it. Presenting no evidence, BP next claimed that a maximum of 1,000 barrels (42,000 gallons) per day were spilling into the Gulf—a large spill, to be sure, but nothing in comparison to the Exxon Valdez. The claim could not be verified because BP—backed by the Obama administration—refused to allow independent scientific analysis, and refused even to release images of the pipe.

Nonetheless, scientists soon refuted BP’s claims. Ian MacDonald, an oceanographer at Florida State University, analyzed only the surface spill to estimate that 9 million gallons of heavy crude had been spilled by April 28, a clip of about 30,000 barrels (1.3 million gallons) per day. SkyTruth, a non-profit environmental analysis firm, put the figure at 12.2 million gallons by May 2, about the same rate. These rates, if they held, would mean that upwards of 60 million gallons would now be spilled—similar to the low-end FRTG released on June 10.

Criticism from these and other scientists finally forced the White House to acknowledge the spill was larger than BP claimed. On April 28, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), estimated that the spill could be at most 5,000 barrels (210,000 gallons). The statistic came under immediate and sharp criticism from scientists who noted it was based on a methodology not at all applicable to the BP spill. The 5,000 barrel figure was nonetheless seized on by the media—and after several more days of sticking to the 1,000 barrel claim—by BP as well. Particularly dishonest was the New York Times. The Times had earlier penned an editorial demanding that Obama not relinquish his expansion of deep-sea drilling. On May 4, the newspaper published an absurdly-reasoned “news analysis” (“Gulf Oil Spill Is Bad, but How Bad?”) that attempted to raise doubts over whether the spill was a significant event at all. (See, “New York Times minimizes Gulf oil spill”).

BP reportedly has had 12 video cameras providing live footage of the spill from the ocean floor since soon after the explosion, but for weeks it refused to allow the public—and possibly even the Obama administration—the right to view this footage. After mounting criticism, BP on May 12 released a brief, pre-recorded clip of one of what was reported to be three leaks in the collapsed riser pipe.

A journalist from National Public Radio (NPR) took the footage to three experts for separate types of scientific analysis. The results were shocking. Timothy Crone, a scientist at the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, put the spill rate at 50,000 barrels (2.1 million gallons) per day. University of California astrophysics professor Eugene Chaing put it in a range of 20,000 to 100,000 barrels daily. Steven Wereley of Purdue University used particle image velocimetry to establish a spill rate of 70,000 barrels per day—which he soon increased to 95,000 barrels—with a margin of error of 20 percent.

In the face of this evidence, the Obama administration and BP steadfastly clung to the official rate of 5,000 barrels per day, repeatedly claiming that there was no way to know how much oil was gushing forth on the ocean floor, and that in any case, knowledge of the dimensions of the spill would not impact the response.

These were both lies. In fact, there were a number of means for calculating the spill rate. BP was aware of at least one of these, since it had recruited two scientists from the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in Massachusetts to oversee the implementation of a sonar device for measuring the spill rate. Richard Camilli and Andy Bowen, who have performed many similar measurements, “were poised to fly to the gulf to conduct volume measurements,” the Times reported on May 14. “But they were contacted [just before their departure] and told not to come, at around the time BP decided to lower a large metal container to try to capture the leak. That maneuver failed. They have not been invited again.”

Scientific criticism, mounting popular anger, and the enormous spread of the spill finally forced NOAA to authorize the FRTG study. On May 27, the Obama administration revealed that the group had established a range of the spill of between 12,000 and 19,000 barrels per day. This too was a lie. In fact, the 12,000 to 19,000 figure represented the range of absolute minimum figures of the various scientists involved. They had not yet come up with a high-end range. Finally, yesterday, on June 10, the scientists on the FRTG released a new range for the rate of the spill of between 30,000 barrels, low-end, and 50,000 barrels.

This data, however, is based on the leak before the riser cut. Leifer told the New York Times on Tuesday that the spill was emitting “way more than it did before [the cut]. I don’t mean by 20 percent. I mean multiple factors.” For his part, Obama’s Energy Secretary Steven Chu—who, as a University of California researcher received a huge grant from BP—insisted that cutting the riser pipe did not significantly increase the rate of flow. He also told Reuters that he felt confident that the moratorium on new deepwater oil drilling could soon be lifted.

Monday, May 31, 2010

Relief wells: "You have to hit something the size of a dinner plate miles into the earth"

Title: Offshore Description: Offshore platform...Image via Wikipedia

Drilling relief wells to stop Gulf oil leak poses challenges
Rebecca Mowbray
The Times-Picayune

With the "top kill" declared a failure and BP moving on to less-desirable options to stop its well from continuing to shoot thousands of barrels of oil each day into the Gulf of Mexico, the grim reality set in that the company may be unable to stop the oil until it completes the first of two "relief wells" in August.

BP has been attempting to contain or stop the flowing oil since its Macondo well exploded April 20, killing 11 people. But the ultimate solution to permanently cap the well is to inject concrete from wells drilled in from the side.

With short-term efforts failing, officials locally and in Washington are beginning to contemplate that the oil could spew until the height of hurricane season.

"There could be oil coming up until August, when the relief wells are dug, " White House energy and climate change adviser Carol Browner said on NBC's "Meet the Press" Sunday morning. "We are prepared for the worst. ... We will continue to assume that we move into the worst-case scenario."

Plaquemines Parish President Billy Nungesser said he got weak in the knees at the Plaquemines Parish Seafood Festival when he saw the news on a Blackberry that efforts to plug the raging well with drilling mud and rubber pieces had failed.

"We're not counting on anything until this relief well is drilled, " Nungesser told CNN Saturday night.

But relief wells are something that, fortunately, engineers don't have to do very often. Drilling the relief well also can be fraught with challenges -- especially working in deep water on a well that has already had problems with gas bubbles.

"You have to hit something the size of a dinner plate miles into the earth, " said Richard Charter, a senior policy adviser at the nonprofit Defenders of Wildlife, who follows spills around the world. "Even in a shallow-water blowout, the drilling of a relief well can be complicated and problematic."

On Sunday, the White House said the government had insisted that BP drill two relief wells instead of one to ensure that it can reach the original well without problems.

Making progress

The company appears to be making progress. Spokesman Graham MacEwen said Friday that the first relief well has now reached 12,090 feet below the floor of the rig, 5,000 feet from the sea floor.

BP interrupted drilling last week to install a blowout preventer, the safety device that's supposed to seal a well in an emergency, but which failed to do so on the main well.

The second relief well, MacEwen said, is 8,650 feet below the floor of the rig.

The relief wells start about a half mile from the original site and try to meet the original at a diagonal.

Drilling a well involves using a pipe that unfolds section by section like an antenna, only upside down.

With each section, the company drills and then pulls out the pipe and puts in casings to form the sides of the well.

Drills are equipped with directional sensors that do three-dimensional surveys to help workers see where the drill bit is and what it's encountering, while metal detectors help guide it toward the metal in the original well.

Once the drills intersect with the original well, typically just above or below where the problem occurred, cement is pumped in to seal it.

Dave Rensink, president-elect of the American Association of Petroleum Geologists, said that drilling a relief well is not that different from drilling a regular well, except that the target is much smaller.

"The only problem is really finding it, " Rensink said of the original well. "You're trying to intersect the well bore, which is about a foot wide, with another well bore, which is about a foot wide. The probability of finding it the first time ... is probably pretty low."

When the company drills into the well casing but misses the right spot, it will need to set a cement plug.

As BP tries to meet the original well, it will need to have plenty of mud on hand, because when the drill actually connects, the mud from the relief well will have a tendency to get sucked into the lower pressure of the original well, and drillers could lose control of the relief well.

"That clearly is a risk. They need to be very specifically prepared when they penetrate the existing well bore, " Rensink said. "You want to make sure you're not creating a problem in your relief well that's the same problem as on your existing well."

No guarantee on timing

With the failure of the top kill, BP plans to cut off the broken riser pipe and install a cap with a "straw" in it that could siphon oil up to a drill ship.

The company may also try installing a new blowout preventer on top of the broken one and using it to try to shut off the well.

Even if the company goes that route and it succeeds in stemming the flow of oil, BP will still move forward with drilling the relief wells because it will enable the company to seal off the top and bottom of the well, making the fix more durable.

But examples from elsewhere in the world show there's no guarantee on the timing, and that drilling a relief well can be dangerous.

The world's worst well blowout and oil spill, the Ixtoc I well in Mexico's Bay of Campeche, was ultimately stopped with a relief well after a containment dome, junk shot and top kill failed, but it took nearly 10 months.

The oil platform sat in about 150 feet of water and blew out in early June 1979 at a depth of 11,625 feet.

According to a 1981 report from the Society of Petroleum Engineers detailing how Pemex, the Mexican state oil company, stopped the well, engineers decided to start drilling two relief wells at the end of June.

Progress was slow. It took one well until Nov. 20 to reach the original well, and the second took until Feb. 5, 1980.

Shutting down the main well took multiple attempts in February and March 1980 as Pemex shot drilling mud through both wells and gradually decreased the flow of oil.

The oil stopped flowing on March 17, and then it took a few more weeks to plug the wells with cement, wrapping up the operation in early April.

The blowout, according to the Society of Petroleum Engineers, lasted for nine months and 22 days.

Tyler Priest, a historian at University of Houston who has written a book about the history of offshore drilling, said Pemex thought it would go a lot faster. He cited a headline in the Aug. 6, 1979, issue of Oil & Gas Journal that reads, "Pemex: Ixtoc may flow until Oct. 3."

"They initially estimated three months. It took them almost 10, " Priest said.

'More caution' needed

Certainly, the technology today is much more advanced than when engineers fought to shut down Ixtoc, but even in modern context, relief wells don't always go smoothly.

Last August, the Thai company PTT Exploration and Production Co. was drilling the Montara well in 260 feet of water in the Timor Sea off of Australia when it well blew up and began leaking oil into the ocean.

It took 10 weeks and five tries for the drilling rig brought in to drill the relief well to hit its target about 8,600 feet below the sea floor. On the last try, there was another rig explosion, which burned for two days.

The oil was finally stopped on Nov. 3, and it took until mid-January to cap the well, according to news reports.

A final report from the Australian government on the Montara incident is due June 18.

Like the Montara well, BP's Macondo well has already shown itself to have pockets of gas big enough to interrupt drilling.

Weeks before the April 20 Deepwater Horizon rig explosion, workers on the rig experienced a gas kick so intense that they abandoned any "hot work" -- smoking, welding, cooking or any other use of fire -- for fear of an explosion.

Don Van Nieuwenhuise, a University of Houston geologist, said that BP will have to tread carefully to avoid the problems encountered at Montara.

"You have to be very careful, because you don't want to have another blowout if you hit petroleum or gas in another level, " Van Nieuwenhuise said. "Any relief or kill well needs to be drilled with more caution than the first well, because you don't want a repeat performance."

Van Nieuwenhuise speaks from experience. In 1979, he worked on killing a gas well in the Gulf of Mexico that blew up when workers ran out of drilling mud. Even though it was only in about 60 feet of water, it took about four and a half months to cap the well by drilling a relief well because of concerns about pockets of gas. "We had to stop drilling every 500 feet, " said Van Nieuwenhuise, who was working for Mobil in New Orleans at the time.

Better drilling technology today, Van Nieuwenhuise said, should make the job easier, but the key is to know where the drill bit is in relation to formations of oil and gas in the area.

BP said it's mindful of the risks and is proceeding cautiously with the relief wells.

"We've got many many safety systems in place, both procedural and technical, " MacEwen said. "We're constantly measuring the pressure in the well."