Banks face billions more in Libor losses

Banks implicated in the Libor-fixing scandal will likely take billions more in losses as a result of pending litigation and regulatory penalties, according to industry analysts at Morgan Stanley. The analysis -- which the authors admit is crude -- is based in part on the experience of Barclays, the British bank which admitted that its staffers attempted to manipulate the London Interbank Offered Rate.

Many of the world's major banks, including Deutsche Bank (DB), Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), Credit Suisse (CS), Citigroup (C, Fortune 500), UBS (UBS) and JPMorgan Chase (JPM, Fortune 500) have disclosed that they are being investigated.

Barclays has agreed to pay $453 million to U.S. and U.K. regulators, a settlement which provided the basis for Morgan Stanley's calculation that at least ten additional banks could be fined between $420 and $651 million by regulators. Other banks implicated in the scandal -- but not included in the Morgan Stanley analysis -- could also face penalties.

Banks that have not yet settled with regulators will likely pay a premium, as Barclays received preferential treatment from regulators because it was cooperative and settled quickly. The other banks, according to the analysis, should expect to pay 30% more. Under another scenario, the banks could face even higher fines after the U.K. Serious Fraud Office completes its investigation. Read more >>

Acceleration Of Financial Meltdown Can't Be Stopped

A picture of a bank run outside a branch of Northern Rock in Birmingham, United Kingdom in 2007, when there was speculation about problems with bank.

Steve Quayle
The Iron boot has been firmly planted to the pedal of this runaway tractor trailer that is heading off the cliff. All of the Euro banks including my former associates at the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS)  are all prepped and ready for the Euro collapse.

What we in the inside are calling "Spanish Flue" is now running hot with temperatures that are setting ten year yields sky high. What many do not realize is that Bankia's demise has started a breach in all the firewalls and safety measures that are in place in the Eurozone. This had an immediate effect on the Italian markets as you can now see the pandemonium that is there.

The eurozone will break-up whether Greece is bailed out or not

Image via Wikipedia

Greek saga won't kill the euro but the end may begin here

Liam Halligan
Greece accounts for only 3pc of the 16 member states' combined GDP, they say, and has lower debts than some of the banks bailed-out during sub-prime. A loan of €20bn (£17.5bn) would do the trick, we're told. That's less than the British government injected into either Lloyds or the Royal Bank of Scotland.

Such analysis sounds vaguely plausible. But its naïve and politically dishonest. Then again, the single currency was built on political dishonesty. That's because, at the heart of the eurozone project there was always a fundamental contradiction – one that the architects of monetary union never dared to address. Now its being highlighted for them, whether they like it or not.

While the European Central Bank controls eurozone interest rates and the money supply, the size of each country's fiscal deficit results from the spending and taxation decisions of its own sovereign government.

How can you enforce collective fiscal discipline in a currency union of individual sovereign states, each answerable to their own electorate? The truthful answer is you can't – not unless you subjugate the autonomy of democratically-elected politicians and, by proxy, their voters.

Voters don't like that. Neither do politicians. Faced with a choice between seriously annoying their own voters and seriously annoying the ECB, the most ardently "pro-European" lawmakers, even those with years of Brussels trough-nuzzling under their belt, will always side with their own. That's why the eurozone will ultimately break-up – whether Greece is bailed out or not.

The eurocrats blame "speculators" for the single currency's woes. That's a bit like sailors blaming the sea. The eurozone is ultimately doomed because, in the end, economic logic wins and the will of each country's electorate bursts through. This current Greek saga won't end the eurozone – but future historians will identify it, perhaps, as the beginning of the end.

Many have said it's hardly surprising that Greece e_SEnD with its history of financial profligacy and capital flight e_SEnD has emerged as the eurozone's Achilles heel. A more germane observation is that, while fiscally wayward, Greece is also the birthplace of democracy. If the Greek population wants to get upset, throw out its elected politicians and reject austerity, it must be allowed to do so. I think they'd be mad, but it must be their choice.

If Berlin and Brussels try to impose their own view on Greece and the "cuts" come from outside, the situation will become absolutely incendiary. Protests will turn into fully-blown riots. Greece will endure very serious social unrest. Deep-seated rivalries and suspicions between countries will be re-ignited. And for what?

Greece is running a budget deficit of 12.7pc of GDP. The real number could be 15pc or more as Greek politicians have lied for years about the extent of their country's liabilities. They're not the first European leaders to do so and they won't be the last. But Greece was, almost uniquely, assisted in its fiscal cover-up by Brussels – with the usual "convergence criteria" being bent to allow Greek euro entry.

As recently as September 2008, the euro seemed to be going well, despite the massive variation between member states. The five-year Greek credit default swap spread was less than 50 basis points. In other words, buying insurance against Greece reneging on its sovereign debt cost only slightly more than insuring German government bonds. Those, such as this columnist, who continued to warn that the eurozone was "dangerous and inherently unstable" were dismissed as cranks, xenophobes or worse.

Then sub-prime hit in earnest. Insuring against Greek default suddenly became a lot more expensive, the CDS spread rising six-fold in eight weeks. The same risk measure is now around 400 basis points, the cost of insuring against Greek default no less than 20 times higher than it was in January 2008. Default risks are growing in Portugal and Spain too, the eurozone's fourth biggest economy.

The problem is that default dangers in Greece – where €20bn of debt falls due in April and May – are making creditors think twice about lending to other cash-strapped governments. Even if Greece avoids default, this latest crisis means governments everywhere will have to pay more for their finance, which in turn will push up borrowing costs for everyone – right across the eurozone and beyond, including in the UK. This is so-called "contagion".

The Greek government has been desperately trying to convince the rest of the world – the Germans in particular – that it will keep its promise to reduce the deficit in its still-shrinking economy to 8.7pc of GDP next year and less than 3pc by 2012. Yet this would amount to the most severe fiscal contraction in the history of modern Europe. It simply won't happen.

The reality is that Greece has two choices – both disastrous for the eurozone. One is to default, leave the euro and re-establish the drachma at a rate low enough to stimulate exports and growth. To write this is heresy. But with general strikes now in the offing, and the Greek public-sector unions resurgent, such a scenario is possible.

For years, the ECB has set rates low to suit France and Germany. This has made life difficult, causing dangerous debt bubbles, in smaller and more inflation-prone eurozone members. Were Greece to take the exit route, the governments of several other single currency members would come under intense pressure to do the same. The eurozone's vital cohesion would be seriously undermined. Its ultimate break-up - or, at least shrinkage to a Franco-German rump - would only be a matter of time.

The other, more likely, option is that Greece accepts a German-led bail-out and "muddles through". But even that would spark an eventual eurozone split. On extending assistance, Berlin and Brussels would talk tough and Greece would promise to behave. Anything less wouldn't be tolerated by German voters. After the horrors of inter-war hyperinflation, Germany has spent more than 50 years building policy credibility. Backing a Greek bail-out would be a massive step – the first time in decades Germany has departed from its fiscal and monetary hard line.

Yet the German government will do it. Refusing to bail-out Greece would risk being labelled "bad Europeans" – something anathema to Germany's post-war elite. Berlin also has a massive financial stake in the euro's status as the world's second most-used reserve currency.

Although Greece will be presented as a one-off e_SEnD a "very exceptional" case e_SEnD once that line has been crossed there is no going back. Other eurozone countries will want a bail-out. Why should Portuguese, Estonian or Spanish workers endure austerity and unemployment, while those in Greece were spared? Why them and not us? If big banks can compete for bail-outs, walking the line of "moral hazard", political leaders will do so too. A Greek rescue by the Germans would spark repeated bail-outs.

In the end, voters in the big eurozone economies, faced with their own fiscal problems will say enough is enough. Europe's monetary union will collapse, just like every other currency union in the history of man. The exception is America – yet the US, as the eurocrats hate to acknowledge, had been through a century and a half of political union before the Federal Reserve was founded in 1913.

That's the key difference. America is a political union, with a system of explicit inter-regional fiscal transfers, and the eurozone isn't. That's why the single currency will ultimately split and be exposed as what it is – a triumph of European hubris and political vanity over unavoidable economic logic.

* Liam Halligan is chief economist at Prosperity Capital Management

Dubai Govt owns 21 per cent of London Stock Exchange

Image via Wikipedia

timesonline
Dubai World, the state-owned corporation that began the panic on Wednesday by demanding a standstill on its interest payments, worsened the mood when it postponed a teleconference for its bond holders, saying the phone lines were overwhelmed.

Gerard Lyons, chief economist with Standard Chartered, said: “The market reaction shows how vulnerable some economies are to the aftermath of the debt binge. This highlights how fragile confidence is.”

The Eid al-Adha religious holiday in the Middle East, and the closure of financial markets in the United States for Thanksgiving, exacerbated the sense of uncertainty in markets that were open for business.

A computer crash at the London Stock Exchange, which by coincidence is 21 per cent owned by the Dubai Government, left dealers unable to trade for three and a half hours.

Shares in HSBC slumped by 5 per cent, wiping £6.2 billion from its value. According to the United Arab Emirates Banks Association, HSBC has £11 billion of loans outstanding to the UAE, of which Dubai is one of seven emirates. HSBC declined to comment.

More than £2.6 billion was slashed from the value of Barclays, while Lloyds and Royal Bank of Scotland, both partly owned by the taxpayer, saw their values fall by £1.7 billion and £1.5 billion respectively.

If Dubai is the sovereign debt equivalent of Northern Rock, then Greece might be its Bear Stearns and Japan its Lehman Brothers

Image by Getty Images via Daylife

Jeremy Warner
telegraph.co.uk
As one financial crisis recedes, another may be beginning. In Dubai this week, we've had a foretaste of what may be to come as governments around the globe seek to grapple with the explosive growth of fiscal deficits and public debt.

Like everyone else, my regard for the miracle of Dubai's fast-evolving skyline has always been tempered with a high degree of scepticism. As a monument to the vanity and hubris of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum, Dubai has long looked like an accident waiting to happen. Such has been the pace of development that nobody could have been surprised by the debt default now threatened. Only the assumed support of Dubai's richer neighbour Abu Dhabi, which is now far from certain, has prevented it happening sooner.

Yet the important question for markets today is not whether Dubai and Sheikh Mohammed can survive the sandstorm; in fact, that is almost irrelevant. Dubai's debts of $80 billion (£48 billion) are a tiresome and unwelcome irritant which will cause further write-downs among western banks, but in the scale of things not of great significance: Britain is planning to raise more than three times that amount in the debt markets in this financial year alone.

Rather, the issue is whether this folie de grandeur of a desert kingdom is just an isolated, and therefore containable, incident, or a more worrying outrider for a wider sovereign debt crisis which might eventually engulf major, advanced economies. Everyone thought the financial implosion of the last two years was largely behind us – yet Dubai has reminded us that if nations start defaulting, then it may be about to enter a new and even more frightening phase.

Think of Dubai not so much as the hors d'oeuvre as the pre-dinner canapé, with the starter reserved for larger economies with distressed fiscal positions, such as Greece and Ireland, moving for the main course on to Japan and possibly even Britain and the US.

Already, there are rumblings. The cost of insuring sovereign debt against default has risen across the board, and for countries thought particularly at risk, bond yields are on a firm upward march.

Across the developed world, public debt is set on an explosive course. According to new estimates by Moody's, the credit ratings agency, the total stock of sovereign debt worldwide will have risen by more than 50 per cent between the start of the financial crisis in 2007 and the end of next year, to $15.3 trillion.

But this is just the beginning. On current projections, that total is set to rise by at least a further 50 per cent, before finally peaking in four to five years' time, and then only if governments have by then taken remedial action.

These are uncharted waters, quite without precedent in peacetime. In seeking to address the financial and economic crisis of the past few years, countries have come close to bankrupting themselves. It is as if, in treating the patient, a physician has infected himself with the same deadly disease.

Perhaps oddly, financing these fast-growing deficits has not so far been a problem, at least for the major advanced economies. Risk-averse investors have spurred high demand for sovereign debt, in the possibly misguided belief that there can be no haven safer than assets guaranteed by taxpayers and the ability of their governments to print money.

More perversely still, the crisis in Dubai has caused a renewed flight to the perceived security of G7 government debt. Money is being withdrawn from the periphery and reinvested in US Treasuries, German bunds, and even British gilts.

But if the banking crisis is anything to go by, that's not where the story ends. There, too, the implosion began with smaller, obviously flawed bit-players, who had self-evidently grown too rapidly and overstretched themselves.

Markets dashed to withdraw funding from Northern Rock, but in transferring the money to the likes of the Royal Bank of Scotland found that they had invested only in something even more unstable. The Rock, it turned out, was just an outlier in a systemically unsafe sector.

If Dubai is the sovereign debt equivalent of Northern Rock, then Greece might be its Bear Stearns and Japan its Lehman Brothers. But why stop there? For Citigroup, think the US, and for RBS and HBOS, think Britain. Only there would be no one to bail out their creditors if America or Britain showed signs of defaulting.

Every family in Britain is now facing a tax liability of £4,350 to prop up Britain’s banking system

Image via Wikipedia

Robert Winnett

The Chancellor confirmed that the Government would pump an extra £25.5 billion into Royal Bank of Scotland, and declared that it was the only way to keep the business alive.

Taxpayers have poured a total of £53.5 billion into RBS, including the £20 billion part-nationalisation last year and another £8 billion that was set aside as insurance against further trouble in the future.

In total, the Government has put £74 billion of taxpayers’ money into the banks, including RBS, Lloyds and HBOS, since the start of the financial crisis last year.

The Conservatives claimed the latest bail-out equated to an extra tax liability of £2,000 for every one of the 17 million families in the country. This comes on top of the £2,350 to which every household is already exposed as a result of previous attempts to prop up the financial system.

It is likely that the new bail-out will have to be funded by government borrowing, which could only be repaid through swingeing cuts to public services or substantial tax rises over the coming years. However, despite consumers picking up the bill for yet more billions for the banks, experts said that the money would still not be enough to get them to increase lending to struggling home owners and businesses.

The bail-out of RBS, which was driven to the brink of collapse in 2008 after a series of reckless investments, now ranks as the biggest in the world.

It means the Government owns 84 per cent of what was, at the peak of the finance bubble, the largest bank in the world.

In total, the British Government’s exposure to RBS now stands at more than £250 billion, because in addition to supplying funds to keep it afloat, the Government has also underwritten many of its so-called toxic assets.

The Chancellor announced the move on Tuesday as part of a package that included a further investment of £5.7 billion for Lloyds Banking Group. More...

U.S. banks extort customers for $38 billion in overdraft fees

While bonuses paid to executives at nine bailed out U.S. banks in 2008 were greater than the net income at some of the banks, Reuters reports U.S. banks will generate $38.5 billion in customer overdraft fees this year, and a large portion of that revenue comes from the "most financially stretched consumers."

The median bank overdraft fee rose this year by one dollar to $26. "Banks are returning to a fee-driven model and overdraft fees are the mother lode," said Mike Moebs, of Moebs Research Services. Overdraft fees accounted for more than 75 percent of service fees charged on customer deposits, said Moebs.

Bonuses for Goldman Sachs Group Inc, Morgan Stanley and JPMorgan Chase & Co were "substantially greater" than the banks' net income. U.S. Sen. Sherrod Brown, an Ohio Democrat and member of the influential Senate banking committee, called Goldman "tone deaf" on the issue of compensation.

Here are a few comments from authorities in France and Britain on bank sector bonuses:

"Fury erupted in Britain over news that Royal Bank of Scotland, which needed a government rescue, was paying an annual pension of 703,000 pounds ($1 million) to its former chief executive Fred Goodwin. Months later, after a campaign that included windows of his Edinburgh home being smashed, Goodwin agreed to reduce his pension, to 342,500 pounds annually.

"FRANCE -- France reacted to public anger over bonuses for financial traders this week by summoning bank chiefs for a meeting and telling the central bank to ensure that new rules on payouts are respected. President Sarkozy instructed top banking executives to report to him on August 25 on their bonus policies."